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I. INTRODUCTION
In an ideal world, a trial would never be unreasonably delayed
or cut short. Judges would never need to juggle multiple difficult trials
or drown in administrative tasks that distract from the fair
adjudication of cases, and lawyers and litigants could be reassured that
each judgment was arrived at fairly and after proper reflection.
Congress created the magistrate system in an attempt to move the
federal judiciary closer to this ideal state of affairs.' The purpose of this
Article I judicial system is to facilitate the resolution of less significant
disputes and speed the administration of procedural tasks. 2 When
district judges can delegate discovery duties, pretrial matters, or petty
disputes to magistrate judges, they should have more time to spend on
more serious matters. Practically, this creates greater judicial efficiency
by easing the workload for overburdened district courts and enabling
the adjudication of a greater number of disputes. However, whether the
magistrate system and its administrative benefits always help to
achieve an optimally fair legal system remains unclear.
This Note argues that the delegation to magistrate judges of
felony-guilty-plea proceedings, though beneficial to district judges,
raises concerns of fairness and constitutionality for criminal
defendants. Accordingly, a magistrate judge should never accept such a
plea. With the consent of litigants, magistrate judges presently have
the authority to conduct misdemeanor trials and "any or all proceedings
in a jury or non-jury" civil trial.3 However, although the Federal
Magistrates Act is silent on the matter, the Supreme Court has
indicated that magistrate judges lack the power to conduct felony
trials.4 This places the authority to accept a felony guilty plea in a
disputed area: functionally similar to duties like evidentiary hearings
or misdemeanor trials, which magistrate judges commonly perform, but
1. See, e.g., Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 928-29 (1991) (explaining that Congress
intended magistrate judges to play an "integral and important role" in creating "an efficient federal
court system").
2. Id. at 933.
3. 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)(3), (c)(1) (2012).
4. Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 871-72 (1989) ("[T]he carefully defined grant of
authority to conduct trials of civil matters and of minor criminal cases should be construed as an
implicit withholding of the authority to preside at a felony trial.").
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closer in significance to tasks they are not permitted to undertake, such
as a felony trial. Courts have handled this problem in a few different
ways, although none have entirely prohibited the delegation of all
duties related to plea acceptance.
Part II of this Note describes the history of the federal
magistrate system and the types of duties these judicial officers
generally perform. The Supreme Court has analyzed the scope of
magistrate judge authority on several occasions, offering two distinct
approaches to statutory interpretation of the Federal Magistrates Act
("FMA") and its "additional duties" clause. Any determination of
whether a district judge may delegate a particular duty to a magistrate
judge involves (1) a statutory analysis of the FMA and (2) a
constitutional analysis of both the rights of defendants and potential
separation-of-powers concerns. This Part describes how courts have
grappled with the power to accept felony guilty pleas in this context.
Specifically, Section II.C discusses the recent decision by the Seventh
Circuit to preclude magistrate judges from formally accepting such
pleas, while still allowing them to perform a Rule 11 colloquy5 and make
a recommendation to the district judge.6
Part III analyzes the statutory and constitutional validity of
magistrate judge administration of felony-guilty-plea proceedings. This
Part argues that the delegation of such a duty violates the F1VIA under
either of the Supreme Court's interpretive approaches and raises
constitutional concerns that should not be overlooked in the name of
efficiency. Section III.C analyzes the ancillary judicial duties that
necessarily attach to a plea acceptance, complicating the constitutional
implications. These considerations are especially difficult to evaluate
because of the imprecise distinction many courts have made between a
plea colloquy and a plea acceptance.
Part IV offers a solution to the dilemma that allows magistrate
judges to conduct these felony-guilty-plea proceedings without
empowering them to accept the pleas with the full authority of a district
judge. This scenario would enhance the efficiency of the judiciary
without unnecessarily burdening the constitutional rights of
defendants or treating them unfairly.
5. A Rule 11 colloquy is the procedure, drawn from FED. R. CRIM. P. 11, by which a court
must assess the factual basis, voluntariness, and knowingness of a criminal defendant's guilty
plea. It is sometimes known as a "change of plea" hearing.
6. United States v. Harden, 758 F.3d 886, 891 (7th Cir. 2014).
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II. THE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES ACT
AND THE MAGISTRATE SYSTEM
Congress created the federal magistrate system to help improve
the efficacy of district judges by easing their "overwhelming caseload[s]"
and enabling them to spend more time in their adjudicatory capacity.7
To this end, Congress conferred in magistrate judges the power to
dispose of "certain subordinate duties" that are likely to distract district
judges from "more important matters."8 While many of these tasks are
enumerated in the Federal Magistrates Act,9 Congress also included a
catchall provision allowing district courts to experiment with assigning
magistrate judges any "additional duties ... not inconsistent with the
Constitution and the laws of the United States."10 This category of tasks
is the subject of much litigation, as the leeway it provides courts in the
name of efficiency occasionally raises constitutional concerns."
A. The History and Purpose of Federal Magistrate Judges
Congress created the magistrate system in 1968 with the
enactment of the FMA.12 Previously, a similar system had existed for
delegating minor legal disputes and "petty offenses" to U.S.
Commissioners. 13 But this proved to be problematic, in part because
many of the commissioners were not attorneys. 14 Congress, seeing the
benefit of relieving district courts of these minor issues, responded by
creating the office of magistrate, a salaried position "to be filled in most
7. United States v. Khan, 774 F. Supp. 748, 750 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
8. Peretz, 501 U.S. at 934.
9. 28 U.S.C. § 636 (2012).
10. Peretz, 501 U.S. at 941.
11. See, e.g., Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858 (1989). Constitutional issues with the
Magistrate System are discussed in Section II.B(2). Briefly stated, magistrate judges are
congressionally created Article I judges. They do not have the political independence that is so
fundamental to the Article III judiciary. Theoretically, if a magistrate judge were to undertake a
task that is inherently "judicial" in nature, it would represent an unconstitutional usurpation of
Article III power by Congress.
12. Gomez, 490 U.S. at 865.
13. Id. at 865-66.
14. See id. at 865 (stating that prior to 1968, disputes were settled by commissioners who
often were not lawyers); see also Ira P. Robbins, Magistrate Judges, Article III, and the Power to
Preside Over Federal Prisoner Section 2255 Proceedings, FED. CTS. L. REV., May 2002, at 1, 2-3,
http://www.fclr.org/articles/html/2002/fedctslrev2.pdf [http://perma.ccfMQ7V-W9C8] (describing
the problematic pay structure of the commissioner system, which tied salary to caseload).
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instances by attorneys."8 Unlike the constitutionally created Article III
judges-those who preside in the federal district courts, the federal
courts of appeals, and the U.S. Supreme Court-magistrate judges are
congressionally created Article I judges who serve limited terms and
are subject to for-cause removal at the discretion of the local district
judge.16 In addition to the authority that commissioners had prior to
1968, Congress granted magistrate judges a number of new powers."
Because their authority comes from Congress rather than the judiciary,
magistrate judges do not bear the indicia of political independence that
are characteristic of Article III adjudicators. Accordingly, to ensure
constitutional protections for litigants, Congress explicitly conditioned
magistrate judge authority on a high level of district court "scrutiny and
control" and precluded magistrate judges from overseeing any disputes
that "required the exercise of delicate judgment"-for instance, bribery
or corruption. 8
Arguably in response to courts' overly narrow construction of
magistrate judge power, Congress amended the F1VIA in 1976 to further
expand the authority of these judicial officers.1 9 These amendments
added a number of enumerated magistrate judge powers, in addition to
a general grant of authority that permits district judges to assign
magistrate judges "such additional duties as are not inconsistent with
the Constitution and the laws of the United States."20 The legislative
history describes Congress's intent in creating this crucial section of the
Act: to give district courts leeway to "experiment" in delegating certain
duties that would assist Article III judges in the "careful and unhurried
performance of their vital and traditional adjudicatory duties."21
Congress expanded magistrate judges' jurisdiction again in 1979,
allowing them to preside over civil and misdemeanor trials upon
assignment by the district court.22 The FMA expressly limits these two
new areas of authority to situations where a litigant consents to
magistrate judge jurisdiction; for instance, a district judge cannot
delegate a civil trial to a magistrate judge if the defendant objects. 23
15. See Gomez, 490 U.S. at 865 (discussing the contrasts between the new office of the
magistrate and the pre-1968 role of United States commissioners).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 865--66.
18. Id. at 866-67.
19. United States v. Ciapponi, 77 F.3d 1247, 1250 (10th Cir. 1996).
20. Gomez, 490 U.S. at 867-69.
21. Id. at 869 (citing H.R. REP. No. 94-1609, at 12 (1976)).
22. Id. at 869-70.
23. Id. at 870-71.
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Currently, the F1VIA expressly gives magistrate judges the power
to undertake a number of different duties. The statute places the
enumerated tasks in a few categories, scattered throughout 28 U.S.C. §
636(a)-(h). A description of magistrate judges' authority to undertake
"pretrial matters" appears primarily under § 636(b), which makes an
important distinction between pretrial matters that a magistrate judge
may "hear and determine," and those for which a magistrate judge must
submit a report and recommendation to the district court.24 Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 72 labels the latter category "dispositive
motions" and the former "nondispositive" because the matters in the
first category are "not dispositive of a party's claim or defense." 25
Generally, the "dispositive" category contains motions of the greatest
significance to a case, like a motion for summary judgment or a motion
for class certification. 2 6 Given the importance of these case-deciding
matters, § 636(b) mandates that the magistrate judge's findings and
recommendations, if objected to, must receive de novo review by the
district judge prior to acceptance. 27 By contrast, a district judge may
only set aside magistrate judge rulings on § 636(b)(1)(A)
"nondispositive" matters when they are clearly erroneous. 28 Thus, the
statute expressly contemplates that magistrate judges should have full
authority to handle matters of lesser significance, but may only assist
district judges with more important matters, rather than ruling on
these issues themselves. 29 This is consistent with the constitutional
principle that Article III adjudicators preside over all issues
fundamentally judicial in nature. 30 In addition to these "dispositive"
and "nondispositive" pretrial tasks, § 636(b) provides that a magistrate
judge "may be assigned such additional duties as are not inconsistent
24. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2012).
25. FED. R. CIv. P. 72. But see Peter J. Gallagher, In Search of a Dispositive Answer on
Whether Remand is Dispositive, 5 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 303, 312-13 (2009) (describing the debate
over whether the "dispositive" matters in Rule 72 are limited to the eight motions enumerated in
the Federal Magistrates Act).
26. § 636(b)(1)(A).
27. § 636(b).
28. § 636(b)(1)(A).
29. See United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 673 (1980) (explaining that "the magistrate
has no authority to make a final and binding disposition" regarding the "dispositive" motions
enumerated in § 636(b)(1)(B)).
30. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1:
The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both
of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall,
at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished
during their Continuance in Office.
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with the Constitution and laws of the United States," 31 a phrase that
allows for judicial creativity in delegating a broad range of tasks.
Another category of duties, listed in § 636(c), comprises those
that magistrate judges can perform only when the parties consent to
their authority. Despite the focus on consent in FVA jurisprudence, 32
the "consent" condition appears in the text of § 636(c), and not alongside
the "additional duties" clause and pretrial matters in § 636(b). With
consent, a magistrate judge may "conduct any or all proceedings in a
jury or nonjury civil matter and order the entry of judgment in the case,"
as long as the local district judge has specifically designated the
magistrate judge to exercise such jurisdiction. 33 In these instances, the
district judge does not review the magistrate judge's actions, although
the court may "vacate" the original delegation upon "extraordinary
circumstances." 34 Instead, review is available directly in the courts of
appeals, under the same standard of deference that the appellate court
would normally grant the district judge, since the parties' consent has
given the magistrate judge full "civil jurisdiction" over the case. 3 5
Notably, the word "felony" never appears in the FMA, and the Supreme
Court has suggested that a magistrate judge may not preside over a
felony trial. 36 To assign such a fundamental adjudicatory task to Article
I judges could raise constitutional issues. 37 Although defendants may
waive their constitutional right to an Article III adjudicator by
consenting to magistrate judge authority, any usurpation of inherently
judicial power by magistrate judges would constitute a separation-of-
powers issue, notwithstanding the defendant's consent. 38 Such
structural constitutional protections, which guarantee a politically
independent judiciary, cannot be waived by any individual.
31. § 636(b)(3) (emphasis added).
32. See Section II.B(1)(b), infra for a discussion of the Supreme Court's consent analysis.
33. § 636(c)(1).
34. § 636(c).
35. Id.; see also Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580, 585 (2003) ("[A] § 636(c)(1) referral gives the
magistrate judge full authority over dispositive motions, conduct of trial, and entry of final
judgment, all without district court review. [It] is to be treated as a final judgment of the district
court.").
36. Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 871-72 (1989). The Federal Magistrates Act does
not specifically omit felony trials, but the Supreme Court has interpreted the statute's legislative
history as indicating a clear intent to preclude such a delegation. Id. at 871-72.
37. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850 (1986) ("[Article
III] safeguards the role of the Judicial Branch in our tripartite system by barring congressional
attempts 'to transfer jurisdiction [to non-Article III tribunals] for the purpose of emasculating'
constitutional courts.") (quoting Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Co., 337 U.S. 582, 644 (1949)).
38. Id.
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B. The Contested Scope of f636(b)(3)'s 'Additional Duties" Clause
The Supreme Court has confronted interpretations of the FMA's
"additional duties" clause on several occasions, with its most significant
decisions coming in two cases that involved the delegation of felony-trial
voir dire to magistrate judges: Gomez v. United States and Peretz v.
United States. This clause, which appears in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3),
contemplates magistrate judge duties beyond those enumerated in the
FVIA, stating that magistrate judges may perform "such additional
duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the
United States." 39 It is a "residual or general category," which the
Supreme Court cautioned "must not be interpreted in terms so
expansive that the paragraph overshadows all that goes before." 40
Whether a district judge may delegate a particular "additional duty" to
a magistrate judge depends on both a statutory and constitutional
analysis. Taken together, Gomez and Peretz form the primary precedent
that informs lower courts' decisionmaking regarding federal magistrate
judges' duties.
1. Statutory Authority of Magistrate Judges to Undertake
"Additional Duties"
a. Gomez v. United States
In its first analysis of the issue, in Gomez v. United States, the
Supreme Court held that federal magistrate judges do not have the
authority to preside over jury selection proceedings in a felony trial.41
The case originated in the Eastern District of New York, where a
district judge had delegated supervision of voir dire in a felony trial to
the local magistrate judge, despite defense counsel's objections. 42 After
the conclusion of voir dire, the defense objected once again to the district
judge, but to no avail.43 On appeal, a divided Second Circuit affirmed
the district court, reasoning that Congress intended the "additional
duties" clause to be construed broadly, thus encompassing delegation of
the jury-selection process. 44
However, the Supreme Court reversed, criticizing the Second
Circuit's reading of § 636(b)(3) as an overly literal construction that
39. § 636(b).
40. Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 245 (2008).
41. Gomez, 490 U.S. at 875-76.
42. Id. at 860.
43. Id. at 860-61.
44. Id. at 861.
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would suggest no statutory limit to the power Congress conferred to
magistrate judges in the Federal Magistrates Act.4 5 Such an
interpretation of the statute would leave the Constitution as the sole
constraint on magistrate judge authority. 6 According to the Court, this
extreme interpretation could not be correct because it would give
magistrate judges the same power as Article III judges, offering no
obstacle to a district judge delegating an entire felony trial to a
magistrate judge.47 Instead, "the [FMA's] carefully defined grant of
authority to conduct trials of civil matters and of minor criminal cases
should be construed as an implicit withholding of the authority to
preside at a felony trial."4 8 In other words, the Gomez Court read the
FMA as precluding district judges from delegating to magistrate judges
any felony trial duties at all.49 Thus, according to Gomez, if jury
selection is a part of a felony trial, the statute implicitly denies
magistrate judges any power to conduct such proceedings. The Court
also read the legislative history as contrasting magistrate judges'
handling of "subsidiary matters" with district judges' "adjudicatory"
function, noting that voir dire is a "critical stage of the criminal
proceeding."50 In this sense, even assuming voir dire is a pretrial matter
and not part of a felony trial, it is "more akin to those precisely defined,
'dispositive' matters," for which the Federal Magistrates Act requires
magistrate judges to submit a "report and recommendation" subject to
de novo review upon a party's request.51 This reasoning suggested that
the statutory analysis of any pretrial "additional duty" assigned to a
magistrate judge should require a determination of whether the
delegated task falls into one of the two categories specified in § 636(b). 52
Furthermore, citing the importance of voir dire, the Court
rejected the notion that jury selection might be a "nondispositive"
45. Id. at 863.
46. Id.
47. See id. (expressing concerns about the constitutionality of delegating felony trial duties
to magistrate judges).
48. Id. at 871-72. Recall that § 636(c) grants magistrate judges the authority to conduct "any
or all" civil trial proceedings if the litigants consent. No part of § 636 mentions felony trials at all.
49. Id.
50. Gomez, 490 U.S. at 872-73.
51. Id. at 873-74.
52. See id. ("It is incongruous to assume that Congress implicitly required [de novo] review
for jury selection, yet failed to even mention that matter in the statute. It is equally incongruous
to assume. . . that Congress intended not to require any review-not even the less stringent clearly
erroneous standard."); cf. Hon. T. Michael Putnam, The Utilization of Magistrate Judges in the
Federal District Courts ofAlabama, 28 CUMB. L. REv. 635, 654 (1998) ("Some matters, however, do
not fit neatly under either § 636(b)(1)(A) or (B) because they are not directly case-dispositive yet
have a profound impact on the case. A motion to remand a case removed to federal court is the
prime example.") (footnote omitted).
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matter for which a magistrate judge can enter an order subject to clear
error review.53 Combining these concerns with the noted absence of any
reference to jury selection in either the FMA or its legislative history,
the Court held that "Congress did not intend the additional duties
clause to embrace this function."54
b. Peretz v. United States Changes the Analysis
Just two years after Gomez, the Supreme Court confronted the
Peretz case, which was similar in many respects but had one key
difference: the petitioner in Peretz explicitly consented to the
magistrate judge's supervision of voir dire.55 At a pretrial conference,
the district judge specifically asked petitioner's counsel if he had any
objection to picking the jury before a magistrate judge, to which he
replied, "I would love the opportunity."56 Petitioner's counsel
subsequently reaffirmed his consent when asked directly by the
magistrate judge and never raised any objection at trial.57 However,
upon appeal, petitioner relied on Gomez to argue for the first time that
the magistrate judge did not have the authority to preside over jury
selection in a felony trial.5 8 The Second Circuit disagreed, reasoning
that the holding in Gomez "applied only to cases in which the magistrate
had acted without the defendant's consent."59 Since the ruling in Gomez,
a circuit split had emerged on the issue of whether the decision hinged
on the litigant's consent to the magistrate judge's supervision of voir
dire.60 The Supreme Court in Peretz affirmed the Second Circuit,
holding that the ruling in Gomez was "narrow" and "carefully limited to
the situation in which the parties had not acquiesced at trial to the
magistrate's role."6 1
According to the Court, the litigant's consent ensures that the
delegation of voir dire in a felony trial complies with the Federal
Magistrates Act. Although the Court acknowledged a general
reluctance to "construe the additional duties clause to include
responsibilities of far greater importance than the specified duties
assigned to magistrates," it found that the task of presiding over voir
53. Gomez, 490 U.S. at 873-74.
54. Id. at 875-76.
55. Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 925 (1991).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 926.
60. Id. at 926-27.
61. Id. at 927.
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dire in a felony trial is "comparable in responsibility and importance"
to the well-established magistrate judge duty of supervising a civil or
misdemeanor trial.62 Rather than reading Gomez as categorically
precluding magistrate judge administration of all felony trial
proceedings, the Peretz Court interpreted the earlier case as "focused on
the fact that those specified duties that were comparable to jury
selection in a felony trial could be performed only with the consent of
the litigants."63 Thus, the Court found that the consent of a defendant
expands the scope of the statutory "additional duties" clause to include
matters akin to any duty that appears in the FMA. However, the Court
never addressed the fact that the "consent" language appears in §
636(c), regarding the delegation of civil trial proceedings, but appears
nowhere in the "additional duties" clause or in § 636(b)(1), which
enumerates magistrate judges' authority in pretrial matters.
Instead, the Court relied on Congress's intent in passing the
FMA, which was to allow experimentation in improving judicial
efficiency. 64 Accordingly, the Peretz Court shifted the focus of the
"additional duties" statutory inquiry from Gomez's more
straightforward textual analysis to the issue of consent: while the
absence of a litigant's approval limits a magistrate judge to
administrative or "subsidiary" matters, consent indicates an
endorsement of "continued innovative experimentations," opening up
an entire class of more significant duties.65 If a particular litigant is
uncomfortable with participating in the "experiment" by allowing a
magistrate judge to supervise a non-subsidiary duty, "he need only
decline to consent to the magistrate's supervision."66 Once a litigant
consents, however, the magistrate judge may perform a duty
"comparable" to those listed anywhere else in the FVIA, limited neither
to civil and misdemeanor cases, nor to the "pretrial matters" of § 636(b)
where the "additional duties" clause appears. 67 In this way, the Peretz
Court framed consent as the crucial factor in analyzing any proposed
magistrate judge task under the "additional duties" clause of the F1VIA.
62. Id. at 933.
63. Id. at 931.
64. See id. at 932 (noting that the generality of the additional duties category illustrates
congressional intent to allow for experimentation).
65. See id. at 934 (finding that the additional duties clause permits courts to experiment and
improve efficiency when the defendant consents).
66. Id. at 935.
67. See id. at 933 (reasoning that a litigant's consent allows a magistrate judge to supervise
not just "subsidiary matters," but also duties "comparable in responsibility and importance" to
presiding over a civil or misdemeanor trial).
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Interestingly, the Peretz Court's focus on consent represents a
complete departure from the mode of analysis the Court had previously
pursued in Gomez.68 Here, the majority never mentioned the differences
between trial and pretrial proceedings or "dispositive" and
"nondispositive" matters.69 Indeed, in his dissent in Peretz, Justice
Marshall questioned why a party's consent should have any effect on
the issue at all.7 0 He expressed concern that the majority's application
of the consent language in § 636(c) to matters beyond the scope of that
section "treat [s] the magistrate's authority in this part of the felony trial
as perfectly coextensive with his authority in civil and misdemeanor
trials."71 Not only do the statute's requirements related to civil or
misdemeanor trials say nothing about magistrate judge authority over
felony trial matters, argued Justice Marshall, but to hold otherwise
adopts a "reading of the [FMA] that Gomez categorically rejected." 72
Just because Congress created a category of enumerated magistrate
judge duties predicated on consent in § 636(c), he said, "does not prove
that Congress also authorized magistrates to conduct trial duties not
expressly enumerated in the Federal Magistrates Act."73
Despite its shift in reasoning, the Peretz Court never expressly
overruled Gomez. As a result, it is unclear what interpretive force the
earlier opinion retains. Gomez likely remains the proper framework for
courts to apply whenever defendants do not consent to a district judge's
decision to delegate a particular task to a magistrate judge. 74 But
whether Gomez has any role in the analysis of duties dissimilar to jury
selection is not obvious from the Peretz opinion. Similarly, it is
uncertain whether litigant consent erases the distinction between
"dispositive" and "nondispositive" matters of § 636(b) in every pretrial
situation. The Supreme Court has not addressed how far the reasoning
of either opinion extends in the magistrate judge context.
68. See Kimberly Anne Huffman, Note, Peretz v. United States: Magistrates Perform Felony
Voir Dire, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1334, 1351-52 (1992) ("The Peretz Court also departed significantly from
its unanimous ruling in Gomez. . . . [T]he consent issue received sparse treatment throughout the
remainder of the Gomez opinion.").
69. See generally Peretz, 501 U.S. 923 (focusing primarily on consent by the defendant).
70. Id. at 941 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242,
259 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that Peretz should be overruled because "the [Gomez]
Court's interpretation of § 636(b)(3) rested primarily on two inferences drawn from the statutory
scheme. . . . Neither of these inferences depended on the presence or absence of the parties'
consent.").
71. Peretz, 501 U.S. at 943 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 948.
74. See id. at 927 (noting that the holding in Gomez was "narrow" and "carefully limited" to
situations in which the parties had not consented to the magistrate judge's role).
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2. Constitutional Concerns and "Additional Duties"
Even a magistrate judge duty that is statutorily sound may still
implicate individual and structural constitutional rights, which would
weigh against delegation from an Article III judge. For example,
criminal defendants enjoy the right to have a district court judge
preside at all "critical stages" of a felony trial.75 However, most courts
have reasoned that criminal defendants can waive their basic rights,
explaining that the "constitutional analysis changes significantly . .. if
the defendant does not object."76 In Peretz for instance, the petitioner
did not object to the magistrate judge's authority to conduct jury
selection-in fact, he actively supported it. In the eyes of the Court, this
amounted to a waiver of his constitutional right to have an Article III
judge supervise the voir dire process.77 Even the most basic criminal
rights, the Court reasoned, are subject to waiver, including the right to
a public trial, the right against unlawful searches and seizures, and the
right to a double jeopardy defense.78
However, even if individual rights are subject to waiver by
defendants, the same is not true of structural separation-of-powers
protections. Because federal magistrate judges were created by
Congress, they are Article I judges, prohibited from encroaching on the
constitutionally granted powers of the Article III judiciary. The
Constitution does not permit a magistrate judge, as a member of a
political branch, to undertake a power meant for the independent
judiciary. Article III judges enjoy constitutional guarantees of lifetime
tenure and no decrease in salary, provisions that ensure the "steady,
upright, and impartial administration of the laws."79 These structural
safeguards of independence do not extend beyond Article III, and the
substantially higher control Congress can exercise over magistrate
judges could theoretically be an incentive to thin the ranks of district
75. United States v Ciapponi, 77 F.3d 1247, 1250 (10th Cir. 1996).
76. Id.
77. Peretz, 501 U.S. at 937.
78. Id. at 936.
79. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton); see also Gonzalez v. United States, 553
U.S. 242, 268-69 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[W]hatever their virtues, magistrate judges are
no substitute for Article III judges in the eyes of the Constitution."); Leading Cases, 122 HARV. L.
REV. 276, 462 (2008):
The Court's gradual approach focusing on the intricacies of consent sidestepped the concern
underlying the constitutionality of the delegation of voir dire to magistrate judges: whether
defendants' rights are violated when an Article I judge, who is appointed by the judiciary and
who does not enjoy the same protections as Article III judges, rather than an Article III judge,
nominated by the President and approved by the Senate, presides over jury selection.
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judges and allow Article I judges to take over the system.80 One court
described the risk of Congress usurping judicial power, noting, "The
'slippery slope' scenario here is easy to envision. District courts might
begin by delegating small felony trials to magistrate judges ....
Eventually Congress would notice the trend ... [and] seek to increase
the number of magistrate judges."8'
Commentators and courts have argued that the Constitution
requires the Article III judiciary to retain control over the "essential
attributes" of judicial power. 82 Courts that have addressed the potential
separation-of-powers problems with the magistrate system have
generally reasoned that no issue arises unless the magistrate judge
assumes control of decisionmaking.83 For most courts, the availability
of de novo review of magistrate judge decisions is sufficient to ensure
that the district judges retain power over the whole process. 84 However,
the absence of sufficient opportunity for review by an Article III judge
creates problems. In the case of voir dire, for instance, the Gomez Court
based its decision in part on concerns that a magistrate judge's
supervision of voir dire would be effectively impossible to review de
novo, 85 given the importance of personally scrutinizing jury
candidates.86 With no way to record the gestures or tone of voice of
prospective jurors, a district judge cannot realistically scrutinize the
assessments made by the magistrate judge, meaning that any review
would be de novo in name alone.87 Without genuine de novo deference,
the Article III judge may not be able to exercise the necessary level of
80. Ciapponi, 77 F.3d at 1250.
81. United States v. Dees, 125 F.3d 261, 267 n.6 (5th Cir. 1997).
82. See Daniel E. Hinde, Note, Consensual Sentencing in the Magistrate Court, 75 TEX. L.
REV. 1161, 1169 (1997) ("Congress cannot create an adjudicatory system that prevents an Article
III judge from making the final decision on certain issues for which the federal courts have subject
matter jurisdiction; Article III judges must retain the essential attributes of judicial power.")
(citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932)).
83. See, e.g., United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 683 (1980) (reasoning that district judge
delegation of authority to magistrate judges "does not violate Art. III so long as the ultimate
decision is made by the district court").
84. See United States v. Osborne, 345 F.3d 281, 283 (4th Cir. 2003) (finding that a district
court judge need only review Rule 11 proceedings conducted by a magistrate judge upon the
defendant's request).
85. The Federal Magistrates Act precludes magistrate judges from ruling on dispositive
matters, requiring instead that they make a recommendation to the district judge, subject to de
novo review upon request. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2012).
86. Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 874-75 (1989).
87. Id.; see also United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 703 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(arguing that when a district judge reviews a magistrate judge's determination of credibility
during an evidentiary hearing, "the magistrate's report is no mere'recommendation,'" but instead,
"effectively the final determination").
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"scrutiny and control" required by constitutional separation-of-powers
principles.
The Peretz Court attached little significance to the Gomez
Court's constitutional concerns about the difficulty of reviewing voir
dire, noting that "nothing in the statute precludes a district court from
providing the review that the Constitution requires."88 Reasoning that
the "entire process takes place under the district court's total control
and jurisdiction," the Court found that no structural constitutional
problems were implicated.89 In other words, the authority district
judges hold over magistrate judges helps to mitigate the structural
risks of assigning judicial tasks to the political branches.90 The fact that
the district judge has authority to appoint and remove magistrate
judges, along with the discretion to delegate duties, alleviates any
concerns that the practice of assigning voir dire to magistrate judges
"emasculate[s] constitutional courts."91 More recently, the Court
reiterated this view in the context of Article I bankruptcy judges,
holding that allowing "Article I adjudicators to decide claims submitted
to them by consent does not offend the separation of powers so long as
the Article III courts retain supervisory authority" and the "'ultimate
decision' whether to invoke [a] magistrate [judge]'s assistance is made
by the district court."9 2 It is not clear from this reasoning if any
magistrate judge action taken under district court supervision could
ever constitute a usurpation of Article III power.
C. The Split over Magistrate Judge Authority to
Conduct Rule 11 Colloquies
1. Rule 11 Colloquies
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 describes the procedure
for a criminal defendant to enter a plea of guilty, not guilty, or nolo
contendere. "Before the court accepts a plea of guilty," the rule reads,
"the defendant may be placed under oath, and the court must address
the defendant personally in open court." 93 During this time, the judge
88. Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 939 (1991) (emphasis added).
89. Id. at 937 (quoting Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 681).
90. Id. (quoting Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 681). But see Tim A. Baker, The Expanding Role of
Magistrate Judges in the Federal Courts, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 661, 676 (2005) ("[L]itigants may
wonder whether a district judge nevertheless gives at least some deference to a trusted magistrate
judge colleague. . . .").
91. Peretz, 501 U.S. at 937.
92. Wellness Int'l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1944-45 (2015) (quoting Peretz,
501 U.S. at 937).
93. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1).
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must undertake three tasks: (1) advising and questioning the
defendant, (2) ensuring that a plea is voluntary, and (3) determining
the factual basis for a plea. 9 4 The "advice and questioning" section
involves providing information about sentencing, the nature of the
charges, and the rights that the defendant will waive by pleading guilty.
To ensure the voluntariness of a guilty plea, the judge must determine
that the defendant's decision to plea is "voluntary and did not result
from force, threats, or promises." Finally, the judge must determine
that there is a "factual basis" for the plea.95 The process of
administering these three steps is commonly known as a "Rule 11
colloquy."" By the terms of the rule, the court must take all three of
these steps "[blefore accepting a plea of guilty" and "[b]efore entering
judgment on a guilty plea."9 7
Thus, the language of the rule indicates that a court may
administer the three steps of a colloquy without actually entering a
final judgment of guilty. Accordingly, most district courts that assign
Rule 11 proceedings as an "additional duty" to magistrate judges only
delegate the three steps of the colloquy, asking for a "report and
recommendation" as to whether the district judge should formally
accept the guilty plea (an act that generally takes place at the
sentencing hearing). In these cases, the magistrate judge will
personally advise and question the defendant and then send a report to
the district judge with a recommendation to accept the plea as
voluntary, knowingly given, and based in fact. So far, every court that
has analyzed this delegation has voiced approval of the process.98 Some
courts have gone even further, allowing district judges to delegate to
magistrate judges not only the Rule 11 colloquy but also the plea
94. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)-(3).
95. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(3).
96. E.g., United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 75 (2002).
97. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(2)-(3) (emphasis added).
98. See, e.g., United States v. Torres, 258 F. 3d 791, 796 (8th Cir. 2001) (concluding that a
magistrate judge's administration of a plea colloquy followed by submission of a report and
recommendation to the district judge did not violate the defendant's rights). But see Honorable
Durwood Edwards, Can a U.S. District Judge Accept a Felony Plea with a Magistrate Judge's
Recommendation?, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 99, 103-04 (2004) (arguing that asking a magistrate judge to
make a "report and recommendation" following a plea colloquy violates Rule 11 because the judge
"who personally addressed the defendant in open court[] must be the one to accept the plea and
enter the finding of guilty"). For further discussion of the report and recommendation process, see
supra Section II.A. The procedure is drawn from the Federal Magistrates Act, which distinguishes
between matters for which magistrate judges may enter a final judgment and those for which
magistrate judges may only make a recommendation to the district judge.
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acceptance. 99 This means that the magistrate judges both preside over
the colloquy and accept, or "enter judgment" of, guilty, subject to de
novo review upon a defendant's request to the district judge.
In July 2014, the Seventh Circuit split from its sister circuits in
addressing the permissibility of this delegation.1 00 In United States v.
Harden, the court held that the FMA allows magistrate judges to
conduct a Rule 11 colloquy in a felony case and create a "report and
recommendation," but it does not permit them to accept the guilty plea
at the conclusion of the colloquy.101 In so holding, the court relied on the
importance of the rights waived by a defendant's guilty plea, including
the right to a trial and, often, the right to appeal.102 The Seventh Circuit
deemed these too significant to allow final disposition of a guilty plea
by a magistrate judge, even if the defendant explicitly consents.103
2. Courts' Analyses of a Felony Guilty Plea as an "Additional Duty"
When applying Supreme Court precedent to the Rule 11 guilty
plea context, courts have continued to focus on consent as the most
important factor. Every circuit that has confronted the issue agrees that
with a defendant's consent, a magistrate judge may conduct a plea
colloquy and make a report of the proceedings for the district judge,
along with a recommendation to accept the guilty plea. This process
places the acceptance of guilty pleas squarely within the "dispositive"
matters in § 636(b)(1)(B) of the Federal Magistrates Act, which limits
magistrate judge power to recommending a disposition to the district
judge. However, several circuits have allowed magistrate judges to go
one step further and actually accept the guilty pleas, implying that the
issue is more analogous to the "nondispositive" matters that magistrate
judges may "hear and determine" under § 636(b)(1)(A).104 These courts
have reasoned that "the two main issues in a change-of-plea-the
voluntariness . . . and the existence of a factual basis-are very similar
to issues that magistrate judges routinely deal with." 05 According to
this view, the formal step of making a report and recommendation to
99. See, e.g., United States v. Benton, 523 F.3d 424, 431 (4th Cir. 2008) (allowing a magistrate
judge to accept a felony guilty plea because "the acceptance of a plea is merely the natural
culmination of a plea colloquy").
100. United States v. Harden, 758 F.3d 886, 891 (7th Cir. 2014).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 887, 891.
103. Id. at 891.
104. See infra note 119.
105. United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1120 (9th Cir. 2003).
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the district judge is unnecessary; 106 the district court's ability to review
the matter upon request provides sufficient structural protection for
defendants, even if such review is not mandatory. 07
Courts have also emphasized the docket-clearing benefits that
come from assigning felony-guilty-plea colloquies to magistrate judges
as emblematic of Congress's purpose in creating the magistrate system.
With overwhelming caseloads, judges may be eager to delegate as much
as possible, especially when it comes to "time consuming exercise[s]"
like performing a Rule 11 hearing.108 Administering these proceedings
often involves interrupting a trial or shortening a trial day in order to
accommodate defendants.1 09 Furthermore, guilty pleas are incredibly
prominent in criminal cases. Indeed, over ninety-seven percent of
convictions result from guilty pleas, leading the Supreme Court in 2012
to characterize the criminal justice system as "a system of pleas, not a
system of trials.""x0 When Congress passed the FMA, it aimed to ease
these types of problems and streamline efficiency. If magistrate judges
could handle calendar-consuming administrative activities, it would
save district judges' time and energy, allowing them to better adjudicate
disputes and grapple with difficult substantive matters. Thus, all of the
courts that have analyzed magistrate judges' administration of Rule 11
colloquies have agreed that, in terms of efficiency, it is precisely the type
of duty that Congress envisioned district judges delegating to
magistrate judges.
A prototypical example of a case supporting magistrate judge
authority to accept felony guilty pleas is United States v. Woodard. In
that case, defendant David Lee Woodard was charged with illegal
possession of a firearm; he ultimately signed a plea agreement with the
government."' The magistrate judge, assigned to conduct the Rule 11
colloquy, repeatedly alerted Woodard to his right to have a district judge
perform the duty.11 2 After clarifying "I am not the District Judge," the
106. See United States v. Benton, 523 F.3d 424, 431 (4th Cir. 2008) ("[T]he acceptance of a
plea is merely the natural culmination of a plea colloquy.").
107. See United States v. Osborne, 345 F.3d 281, 283 (4th Cir. 2003) ("[The availability of [de
novo] review .. . rather than a required performance thereof . .. safeguard[s] the integrity of the
federal judiciary.").
108. See United States v. Khan, 774 F. Supp. 748, 749 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (noting the importance
to district judges of delegating Rule 11 proceedings to magistrate judges given the rapid expansion
of criminal caseloads).
109. Id.
110. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012); see also Baker, supra note 90, at 673
(noting the rapid decrease in the percentage of criminal cases that go to trial from 44.95% in 1980
to 11.76% in 1993).
111. United States v. Woodard, 387 F.3d 1329, 1330 (11th Cir. 2004).
112. Id.
[Vol. 68:6:17951812
2015] MAGISTRATE JUDGES AND FELONY GUILTY PLEAS 1813
magistrate judge informed Woodard, "[Y]ou do not have to consent. You
can hold off, and you have the right to have [the district judge] hear
your change of plea." 113 Once Woodard reiterated his understanding
and consent, the magistrate judge proceeded to conduct the Rule 11
colloquy, and then formally accepted the guilty plea. 114 At the
sentencing hearing before the district judge, Woodard voiced no
objections to the magistrate judge's involvement in the plea
acceptance. 115 However, on appeal, he challenged the magistrate judge's
authority to adjudicate him guilty of a felony on both statutory and
constitutional grounds. 116
Citing the Gomez and Peretz decisions, the Eleventh Circuit
concluded that a defendant's consent is the crucial factor in determining
whether delegation to a magistrate judge is permissible.117 The court
rejected the argument that a guilty plea is too important a task to
assign to a magistrate judge, reasoning that conducting a Rule 11
colloquy "is 'less complex' than several of the duties the FVIA expressly
authorizes magistrate judges to perform."11 8 Furthermore, the court
noted that magistrate judges regularly judge the voluntariness of out-
of-court statements during pretrial evidentiary hearings, a task that is
"remarkably similar" to the assessment of voluntariness required by
Rule 11 proceedings.119 Applying the Peretz framework, whereby
comparability is the primary test of validity of a magistrate judge duty,
the similarities between evidentiary hearings and accepting a guilty
plea suggest that magistrate judges already have the skills necessary
to perform the latter duty. Thus, because the acceptance of a guilty plea
is comparable to the duties enumerated in the FIA, the court concluded
that this act is within the authority of a magistrate judge to perform,
as long as the defendant consents.
No court that has addressed this issue, including the Seventh
Circuit in Harden, has found any violation of the structural separation-
of-powers protections offered by Article III of the Constitution. For
example, in Woodard, the court rejected such an argument, citing the
control district judges have over magistrate judges as defeating any
concerns of Article I officers wielding too much adjudicatory power.12 0
Currently, every circuit that has addressed the problem endorses the
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1330-31.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1332.
118. Id. at 1332-33 (quoting United States v. Williams, 23 F.3d 629, 632-33 (2d Cir. 1994)).
119. Id. at 1333.
120. Id.
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ability of a district judge-with the defendant's consent-to delegate
Rule 11 colloquies to a magistrate judge, followed by a report and
recommendation. The Tenth, Eleventh, and Fourth Circuits have
explicitly authorized magistrate judges to formally accept a guilty plea
at the conclusion of the colloquy, an entry of judgment that the district
judge reviews de novo if the defendant so requests. 121 The reasoning of
several other circuits suggests that they would also characterize final
acceptance of a guilty plea as an "additional duty" that district judges
may delegate to magistrate judges under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3).1 22
With the Harden case in 2014, the Seventh Circuit became the
first to split from this view, allowing the delegation of a Rule 11 colloquy
with a "report and recommendation," but holding that the FVIA
prohibits magistrate judges from accepting felony guilty pleas,
regardless of the defendant's consent.123 Indeed, the appellant in
Harden, indicted on possession with the intent to distribute cocaine,
explicitly consented to the magistrate judge's taking of his guilty plea
after being informed of the consequences. 1 24 Specifically, before
accepting his plea, the magistrate judge asked Harden, "You
understand that by signing this waiver and consent, if I accept your
plea today you don't have any right to later come back and complain
that your plea wasn't taken by [the district court judge]?"1 25
Furthermore, neither Harden nor the prosecutor made any claim that
there was a defect in the colloquy procedure or that the magistrate
judge's instructions were in any way misleading. 126 Following the
colloquy, the magistrate judge accepted the defendant's plea of guilty to
the drug charges, and the district judge subsequently approved the plea
agreement between Harden and the government. 127 While before the
district judge, Harden did not object to the magistrate judge's role in
the plea proceedings. However, he ultimately filed an appeal with the
Seventh Circuit questioning the validity of the plea acceptance. 128
On appeal, applying the Peretz "comparability" analysis, the
Seventh Circuit held that the FMA categorically does not authorize the
magistrate judge's acceptance of a felony guilty plea.1 29 The court held
121. United States v. Benton, 523 F.3d 424, 431 (4th Cir. 2008); Woodard, 387 F.3d at 1332-
33 (11th Cir. 2004); United States v. Ciapponi, 77 F.3d 1247, 1250-51 (10th Cir. 1996).
122. See, e.g., United States v. Dees, 125 F.3d 261, 265-66 (5th Cir. 1997).
123. United States v. Harden, 758 F.3d 886, 891 (7th Cir. 2014).
124. Id. at 887.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 887-88.
129. Id. at 891.
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that even Harden's consent could not grant magistrate judges the power
to perform such an important task, because a felony guilty plea is too
significant to be comparable to the duties enumerated in the statute.130
The ability of the well-qualified magistrate judge to conduct the plea
proceedings made no difference in the analysis. 131 Highlighting the
appellant's failure to object to the magistrate judge's authority before
the district court, the government argued that the magistrate judge's
actions had resulted in no prejudice to Harden. 132 However, the Seventh
Circuit disagreed, reasoning that "[a]lthough Harden has not shown
that he suffered prejudice ... and although nothing has been suggested
to criticize the magistrate judge's performance, the statute simply does
not authorize a magistrate judge to accept a felony guilty plea." 133
Despite the relative ease of a magistrate judge taking such an
action, the Seventh Circuit held that the "additional duties" clause of
the Federal Magistrates Act does not encompass such an important
task as accepting a felony guilty plea. 134 Although other courts
addressing this question likened plea colloquies to other common
magistrate judge duties from an administrative perspective, the
Seventh Circuit asserted that accepting a guilty plea is actually more
comparable to conducting a felony trial due to the gravity of the task.1 35
Because the acceptance of a guilty plea is a decision that disposes of the
entire case, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that it was too significant to
group with the types of preliminary matters magistrate judges usually
handle, which are subject to review and the later opportunity to "contest
the government's evidence, case, and conduct before any determination
of guilt." 13 6 The court went further, noting that in many cases accepting
a guilty plea is "even more final" than a guilty verdict, because
defendants often waive rights of appeal and habeas corpus as a part of
plea agreements.1 37 Although felony guilty pleas are incredibly
common, clogging up the dockets of federal judges, their prevalence
"does not render them less important, or the protections waived through
them any less fundamental."13 8 Thus, the Harden court's decision was
based primarily on a comparison of the "importance" of felony guilty
pleas with other magistrate judge tasks, a stark contrast to the
130. Id.
131. Id. at 890.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 891. The Harden court did not reach the question of constitutionality.
134. Id. at 889.
135. Id. at 891.
136. Id. at 889.
137. Id. at 888.
138. Id. at 891.
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"responsibility" comparison that has been prevalent among the other
circuits. 139
The Seventh Circuit offered its approval of the practice of a
magistrate judge creating a "report and recommendation" for a district
judge to review in determining whether to accept a defendant's plea.140
Endorsement of the "report and recommendation" procedure aligns the
Seventh Circuit with its sister circuits, reflecting the unanimous view
on the subject. However, the Harden court was the first to explicitly
declare the final step of plea acceptance to be beyond the authority of
magistrate judges. The Seventh Circuit's decision has already caused a
stir throughout the circuits-in the months following the decision,
several defendants have already used the case to attempt to withdraw
a plea given to a magistrate judge. 141 These subsequent cases have only
solidified the split, as other circuits have declined to adopt Harden or
its reasoning, 142 and lower courts within the Seventh Circuit have
refused to extend the holding of Harden to plea colloquies as well as
acceptances.143
III. QUESTIONING THE STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR
DELEGATING FELONY PLEA PROCEEDINGS TO A MAGISTRATE JUDGE
As the permissibility of accepting a felony guilty plea hinges on
a court's determination of the scope of a magistrate judge's "additional
duties," both a statutory and constitutional analysis are required. 144
However, the proper method of statutory analysis is not completely
clear. The Gomez opinion suggests that magistrate judges should not
preside over any part of a felony trial, and that any proposed pretrial
"additional duty" should fit into one of the categories of dispositive or
139. See Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 933 (1991) (describing felony voir dire as
"comparable in responsibility and importance" to duties enumerated in the FMA) (emphasis
added).
140. Harden, 758 F.3d at 891.
141. See, e.g., United States v. Marshall, NO. 05-30079, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166846, at *1-
3 (C.D. Ill. Dec. 2, 2014) (analyzing a motion to withdraw a plea given before a magistrate judge
for lack of jurisdiction on the basis of the Harden decision).
142. See Norville v. United States, 10-CR-1046 (VM), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117414, at *23
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2015) (rejecting an argument based on Harden because "the reasoning and final
pronouncement of the Seventh Circuit is in direct conflict with established Second Circuit
precedent").
143. See Shields v. United States, No. 14-0222-DRH, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64698, at *29
(S.D. Ill. May 18, 2015) ("Although [defendant] pled guilty at a hearing before Magistrate Judge
Proud, Judge Proud issued a Report and Recommendation regarding the guilty plea . . .. The
Seventh Circuit did not question this methodology in Harden.").
144. See, e.g., United States v. Benton, 523 F.3d 424, 429 (4th Cir. 2008).
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nondispositive matters enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b).145 By
contrast, according to the Peretz analysis, whether a magistrate judge
task is permissible under the authority of the Federal Magistrates Act
depends on whether it is "comparable" to the duties enumerated in the
statute. 146 Under either approach, even a task permitted by the statute
may still raise constitutional concerns related to individual rights and
Article III structural principles. 147
A. A Critical Look at the Statutory Authority of Magistrate Judges
to Accept Felony Guilty Pleas
1. Textual Statutory Analysis
A straightforward textual analysis of the FMA suggests that the
administration of a felony guilty plea is beyond the statutory authority
of a magistrate judge.148 In Gomez, the Supreme Court engaged in
something closer to a textual analysis, reading the FMA's extensive
discussion of magistrate judge authority in misdemeanor and civil trials
as precluding magistrate judge administration of any felony trial
matters.149 Under this framework, if acceptance of a guilty plea is part
of a felony trial, a district judge could never delegate the task to a
magistrate judge. Alternatively, when considering the possibility that
voir dire may be a pretrial task, the Gomez Court attempted to fit it into
the "dispositive" and "nondispositive" categories that appear in §
636(b).150 By the text of the statute, pretrial matters that are dispositive
of a case are subject to de novo review, and a magistrate judge can only
issue a recommendation on those matters. 151 Meanwhile, magistrate
judges may "determine" less important pretrial issues; those orders are
only subject to clear error review. 152 Finally, the delegation of entire
civil trials upon party consent is subject to no district court review
whatsoever; instead, these orders are directly appealable to a U.S. court
145. See Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 873-74 (1989).
146. United States v. Harden, 758 F.3d 886, 888 (7th Cir. 2014).
147. See, e.g., United States v. Dees, 125 F.3d 261 (5th Cir. 1997).
148. See id. (describing the task of accepting a guilty plea as too important to be statutorily
permissible under 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(3)).
149. See Gomez, 490 U.S. at 871-72 ("[The carefully defined grant of authority to conduct
trials of civil matters and of minor criminal cases should be construed as an implicit withholding
of the authority to preside at a felony trial.").
150. See id. at 873-74 ('To the limited extent that it fits into either category, we believe jury
selection is more akin to those precisely defined, 'dispositive' matters for which subparagraph (B)
meticulously sets forth a de novo review procedure.").
151. 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) (2012).
152. § 636 (b)(1)(A).
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of appeals. 53 Yet, to the extent that the acceptance of a felony guilty
plea is a pretrial matter, it does not fall into any of these three
categories. In some circuits, courts allow magistrate judges to "hear and
determine" these matters, but subject these determinations to de novo
review rather than clear error.154 Courts take this action to guard
against separation-of-powers concerns,155 but, in doing so, create a
hybrid category that appears nowhere in the text of the statute.
Thus, on the basis of the law's text, conditioning acceptance of
guilty pleas on the availability of de novo review appears to be
statutorily unsound. While the Gomez Court more or less followed a
textual approach, the Peretz Court did not consider the differences
among the various categories of duties in the FVIA; instead, it focused
on litigant consent as a means of expanding magistrate judge duties.
Even if Peretz is correct in its approach, the reasoning in that case may
not extend to matters like guilty plea acceptance, which, unlike voir
dire, involve an entry of judgment. 15 6 If the presence of de novo review
is simply meant to ensure that the district judge retains control over
the proceedings, then this departure from the textual categories of the
statute unnecessarily raises a constitutional concern with the
"additional duties" clause.15 7 The "constitutional avoidance" canon of
construction suggests that courts should interpret the FIA as
withholding from magistrate judges any authority that would raise
such questions.158 By contrast, the Peretz opinion evades these
constitutional concerns by engaging in a consent-focused analysis more
divorced from the statute's text. However, this approach arguably
leaves courts with "no principled way to decide ... statutory question[s]"
that arise under the FNIA.1 59
153. § 636(c).
154. See United States v. Benton, 523 F.3d 424, 431 (4th Cir. 2008) (noting that Rule 11
proceedings administered by a magistrate judge are subject to de novo review upon request).
155. See id. ("Emphasizing ... the litigants' right to seek de novo review of the Rule 11
proceedings as a matter of right, [the courts of appeals have] found no Article III violation.").
156. See Wellness Int'l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1958 (2015) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) ("[Gomez and Peretz] therefore have little bearing on this case, because none of them
involved a constitutional challenge to the entry of final judgment by a non-Article III actor.").
157. See Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 864 (1989) ("It is our settled policy to avoid an
interpretation of a federal statute that engenders constitutional issues if a reasonable alternative
interpretation poses no constitutional question.").
158. See United States ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909)
("[Wihere a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful
constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such questions are avoided, [courts'] duty
is to adopt the latter.").
159. Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 261 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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2. Peretz "Comparability" Statutory Analysis
According to the Peretz analysis, whether a magistrate judge
task is permissible under the Federal Magistrates Act depends on
whether it is "comparable" to the duties enumerated in the statute. 60
This "comparability" analysis considers both the consequences and
practical dimensions of a felony guilty plea in comparison with other
duties specifically assigned to magistrate judges.161 From the
perspective of judicial efficiency, delegating authority to magistrate
judges to conduct Rule 11 colloquies clears district court dockets of a
"time consuming exercise"1 62 that is "less complicated than a number of
duties the Magistrates Act specifically authorizes magistrates to
perform."1 63 In comparing plea proceedings to the "responsibility"
involved in other magistrate judge duties, Courts have reasoned that
Rule 11 colloquies resemble most other permissible magistrate judge
tasks because, in the sense that "the defendant's guilt or innocence is
not being contested," the magistrate judge performs more of an
administrative than an adjudicatory function.1 64 Furthermore, the FMA
specifically assigns magistrate judges the ability to handle post-
conviction motions, which often require an assessment of the
voluntariness of a guilty plea.1 65 This statutory delegation suggests
that, as a matter of judicial ability, magistrate judges are just as
qualified as district judges to supervise a Rule 11 colloquy. There is
little reason to believe that a magistrate judge would perform this duty
deficiently-assessing the validity of a guilty plea is a task that is both
simple in administration and familiar in substantive content.
However, a comparison to the "importance" of established
magistrate judge duties suggests that a felony guilty plea has more
serious consequences than any other magistrate judge task and may
involve the waiver of individual rights that are too important to treat
as ministerial, even with a defendant's consent.1 66 When a criminal
defendant enters a guilty plea, whether before a magistrate judge or a
district judge, that person waives many rights guaranteed by the
Constitution. For this reason, the Harden court argued that a guilty
160. United States v. Harden, 758 F.3d 886, 888 (7th Cir. 2014).
161. Id.
162. United States v. Khan, 774 F. Supp. 748, 749 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
163. United States v. Williams, 23 F.3d 629, 632 (2d Cir. 1994).
164. Khan, 774 F. Supp. 748 at 752.
165. Id. at 753.
166. See Harden, 758 F.3d at 889 (asserting that the consequences of a taking a felony plea
are similar in importance to conducting a felony trial, a task that magistrate judges are unable to
conduct even with the consent of the parties).
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plea is often "even more final than a guilty verdict," because it
represents a defendant's "consent that judgment of conviction may be
entered without a trial."167 In other words, a decision to plead guilty
means that a criminal has given up the constitutional right to a trial by
jury, guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.
Because many guilty pleas involve a plea agreement with the
government, a criminal defendant will often relinquish other significant
rights as well. Specifically, "defendants often waive their appellate and
habeas corpus rights" as a part of such agreements, consequences that
are far more conclusive than a usual criminal trial.168 Although the
Supreme Court has held that criminal defendants may waive these
individual constitutional protections, the relinquishment of rights still
affects the statutory analysis prescribed by Peretz because it suggests
that accepting a felony guilty plea may be dissimilar from other
magistrate judge duties, which generally do not involve the waiver of
constitutional rights. Applying the "comparability" test, the Harden
court decided that the "importance" of these concerns indicated that
accepting a guilty plea is not the type of administrative duty envisioned
by the Federal Magistrates Act.169 This reasoning echoes the Gomez
Court's view that the Constitution should not be the only constraint on
magistrate judge authority. Specifically, the Harden opinion suggests
that even if a defendant's consent erases constitutional concerns, the
very fact that the delegation raises such issues demonstrates that the
task is beyond the statutory authority of magistrate judges.
Most courts that have addressed magistrate judges' statutory
authority to accept guilty pleas have used the Peretz approach of
determining whether it is "comparable" to the other duties allowed by
the FMA. This analysis has not necessarily been limited to those duties
actually enumerated in the Act, but has also considered tasks that
courts have previously found to be an "additional duty."1 70 For instance,
several courts have analyzed whether a plea proceeding is a comparable
task to the supervision of voir dire, a magistrate judge duty that does
not appear in the statute and was widely contested prior to the Peretz
decision.
167. See id. at 888 (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (emphasis
added)).
168. Id. at 889.
169. See id. at 888-89 (asserting that the "additional duties" clause cannot be stretched to
apply to felony guilty pleas because of the important consequences associated with waiving the
right to trial).
170. See, e.g., United States v. Dees, 125 F.3d 261, 265 (5th Cir. 1997) (delegating plea
proceedings to a magistrate judge on the basis of similarity to a non-enumerated magistrate judge
duty approved by the court in a prior case).
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B. A Constitutional Analysis of Magistrate Judge Authority
to Accept Felony Guilty Pleas
The statutory assessment of additional magistrate judge duties
since Peretz has frequently involved a common-law approach, mostly
divorced from the text of the Federal Magistrates Act. Rather than
analyze how a particular duty fits within a provision of the statute,
courts have looked more generally at whether a proposed task
resembles other accepted magistrate judge duties. Yet even when a
duty is statutorily permissible, individual and structural constitutional
rights remain a concern.
Given the common-law approach to the "additional duties"
clause, there is some measure of risk that, over time, courts will
continue to authorize magistrate judge tasks that move closer toward
actually presiding over entire felony trials. 171 Indeed, the FMA does not
specifically preclude magistrate judges from conducting felony trials,
although the Supreme Court has reasoned that Congress intended such
a limitation by expressly authorizing magistrate judges to conduct civil
and misdemeanor trials. 72 Regardless of the FMA's position with
respect to the delegation of felony trials, the Constitution provides an
independent bar to magistrate judge jurisdiction over any
fundamentally "judicial power."1 73 Similarly, if acceptance of a guilty
plea is an essential Article III function, then the right of a defendant to
have the plea accepted by a district court judge would be structurally
protected and impossible to waive.
Historically, judges have at least theoretically expressed
reluctance on these structural grounds to delegate felony-guilty-plea
acceptance to magistrate judges. In 1991, the Judicial Conference
Committee on the Administration of the Magistrate Judges System
"expressed a strong view that judicial duties in critical stages of a felony
trial, particularly the acceptance of guilty pleas ... are fundamental
elements of the authority of district judges under Article III of the
Constitution." 17 4 A decade earlier, the same group of judges made a
171. See id. at 267 (describing constitutional concerns that magistrate judge authority will
grow as magistrate judges move closer to presiding over felony trials).
172. See Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 872 (1989) (asserting that the carefully defined
limitations of the statutory language in the Federal Magistrates Act should be interpreted as a
withholding of the authority for magistrate judges to preside at felony trials).
173. See U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 1 ("The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish.").
174. Dees, 125 F.3d at 263; see also Philip M. Pro & Thomas C. Hnatowski, Measured Progress:
The Evolution and Administration of the Federal Magistrate Judges System, 44 AM. U. L. REV.
1503, 1525 & n.176 (1995) (noting the view of the 1991 Magistrate Judges Committee that
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similar argument in a report to Congress, asserting that it is
"preferable" for the same judge who enters judgment and decides the
appropriate sentence to also conduct the plea proceeding.175
However, some courts have argued that having magistrate
judges accept guilty pleas is actually fairer to criminal defendants in
certain ways and bolsters the protection of individual rights. Having a
magistrate judge preside over a Rule 11 colloquy guarantees that two
pairs of eyes will look over a defendant's plea proceedings. This is
especially true in districts that require the magistrate judge to file a
"report and recommendation," because the district judge will
necessarily see a transcript of the plea hearing while making a decision
about sentencing. When the district judge presiding over sentencing
also conducts the plea colloquy, there is generally no reason to review
the plea transcript. 176 By contrast, a district judge will always review a
magistrate judge's report before accepting the defendant's plea,
providing an "additional layer of scrutiny not otherwise generally
available."177 Supreme Court Justice Blackmun made a similar
argument in his concurrence in United States v. Raddatz, suggesting
that the magistrate system as a whole provides a "second level of
procedural protections" that contribute to more accurate judicial
decisionmaking. 178
While most courts have reasoned that separation-of-powers
problems do not arise unless the magistrate judge is in control of
decisionmaking, the integrity of the district judge's decision to assign a
particular task to a magistrate judge is potentially tarnished by the
conflict between constitutional protections and an overloaded docket. A
promise of lifetime tenure and consistent salary is unlikely to be a factor
in this workload-based choice, suggesting that district judges'
delegation of tasks may lack the structural-objectivity protections that
attach to most judicial decisions.179
Furthermore, the fact that appellate courts have not required
mandatory review of magistrate judge Rule 11 proceedings undermines
"accepting guilty pleas, conducting sentencing proceedings, and presiding over felony trials" were
duties that district judges should not delegate to magistrate judges).
175. Pro & Hnatowski, supra note 174, at 1512.
176. See United States v. Khan, 774 F. Supp. 748, 755-56 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) ("District judges at
sentencing do not normally review the transcripts of the pleas that they take.").
177. Id. at 756.
178. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 685 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
179. See William G. Young, An Open Letter to U.S. District Judges, FED. LAW., July 2003, at
30, 33 (describing how district judges would "like to do less" and suggesting that the overloaded
judiciary is complicit in Congress's efforts to "strip away rights that were traditionally vindicated
in the district courts . . . confident that, as a practical matter, the exercise of these rights will be
markedly diminished").
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the idea that district judges retain total control over magistrate judge
decisionmaking. In United States v. Osborne, for instance, the appellant
challenged the validity of her plea before the magistrate judge on the
grounds that the district judge failed to conduct a de novo review of the
proceedings. 80 However, because the appellant never requested review
of her plea proceedings, the Fourth Circuit found no error.181 "[A]
district judge need not review such proceedings de novo unless
defendant requests such review," the court reasoned, because it is "the
availability of review ... rather than a required performance thereof,
that safeguard[s] the integrity of the federal judiciary."1 82 In other
words, a judicial district need not guarantee compulsory review of a
magistrate judge's actions, as long as such review would be available
upon request of the defendant. Additionally, the Supreme Court has
reasoned that de novo review under the FMA does not require a district
judge to conduct a rehearing on a contested matter.1 83 As a practical
matter, these factors call into question how much control Article III
judges truly exercise over magistrate judge acceptance of felony guilty
pleas.184
C. Factors Complicating the Statutory and Constitutional Analyses
Although the Supreme Court has reasoned that constitutional
separation-of-powers guarantees are not violated as long as Article III
judges make the "ultimate decision,"185 the cases concerning the use of
magistrate judges to accept felony guilty pleas demonstrate the
challenges of this delineation. One difficulty in identifying the
decisionmaker in these cases is the confusing and inconsistent manner
in which various courts have dealt with the significant difference
between a plea colloquy and a plea acceptance. In Harden, the Seventh
Circuit offered its support of the "report and recommendation"
process-which is akin to the traditional magistrate judge authority
over important, "dispositive" pretrial matters-but strongly disagreed
that magistrate judges have the authority to accept a guilty plea
180. United States v. Osborne, 345 F.3d 281, 283 (4th Cir. 2003).
181. Id. at 284.
182. Id. at 289 (emphasis added).
183. Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 674 ("It should be clear that on these dispositive motions, the
statute calls for a de novo determination, not a de novo hearing.").
184. See Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 874 (1989) (reasoning that magistrate judges
are precluded from presiding over felony voir dire, in part because of "serious doubts that a district
judge could review this function meaningfully").
185. Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 683.
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following a Rule 11 colloquy.186 Other courts have been equally explicit
in their endorsement of plea acceptance by magistrate judges, such as
the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Benton, which held that "the
acceptance of a plea is merely the natural culmination of a plea
colloquy."187 Meanwhile, the Eastern District of New York pointed out
that the district judge will "necessarily review" the work of the
magistrate judge during the sentencing hearing, which suggests that
there is no reason to require a report instead of an acceptance.188
Many other courts' opinions simply make no mention of this
important distinction. For instance, although the magistrate judge
involved in United States v. Dees made a report and recommendation to
the district judge, the Fifth Circuit occasionally framed the issue as an
analysis of "magistrate judges' taking of guilty pleas."'89 The court's
language was frequently imprecise, using "the taking of a plea"
interchangeably with "conducting plea proceedings." 90 The Eighth
Circuit's treatment of the issue is similarly ambiguous in United States
v. Torres, which analyzed whether magistrate judges have the authority
to "conduct plea colloquies" under a section titled "Magistrate Judge's
Acceptance of the Plea."' 9 ' This confusing state of affairs was expressly
noted by the Woodard court, which admitted that "the decisions [of our
sister circuits] reveal a lack of uniformity in the language used by
magistrate judges."1 92
Although the distinction between colloquy and plea acceptance
is subtle, it can potentially lead to significant consequences. The final
acceptance of a guilty plea has important ancillary effects on the rest of
the criminal process, which courts should consider in their analyses of
the permissibility of delegation to a magistrate judge. In contrast to the
frequently abstract constitutional and statutory issues, these ancillary
concerns often manifest as concrete problems for criminal defendants.
For instance, Rule 11(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
outlines different standards for how a defendant may withdraw a guilty
186. See United States v. Harden, 758 F.3d 886, 891 (7th Cir. 2014) (arguing that guilty pleas
are "too important" a task to delegate to magistrate judges).
187. United States v. Benton, 523 F.3d 424, 431 (4th Cir. 2008).
188. See United States v. Khan, 774 F. Supp. 748, 755-56 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (arguing that
district judge review of magistrate sentencing "provides both the government and the defendant
with an additional layer of scrutiny not otherwise generally available to them").
189. United States v. Dees, 125 F.3d 261, 263 (5th Cir. 1997) (emphasis added).
190. See id. at 268 ("We find that plea proceedings conducted by magistrate judges are
sufficiently reviewable so as not to threaten Article III's structural guarantees. The taking of a
plea by a magistrate judge does not bind the district court to accept that plea.").
191. United States v. Torres, 258 F.3d 791, 794 (8th Cir. 2001).
192. United States v. Woodard, 387 F.3d 1329, 1334 (11th Cir. 2004).
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plea, dependent on whether or not the court has "accepted" the plea. 193
Specifically, prior to the court's acceptance, Rule 11 prescribes an
extremely liberal standard that allows a defendant to withdraw the plea
"for any reason or no reason."1 94 By contrast, a court's decision to accept
a plea raises the bar, requiring a defendant to "show a fair and just
reason for requesting the withdrawal."195
There are many reasons a defendant may want to withdraw a
guilty plea between a magistrate judge's proceedings and a district
judge's formal acceptance. For instance, defendants have claimed that
they were entrapped, 196 that their counsel had failed to fully explain the
plea,197 or that they did not completely understand that their plea
agreement required mandatory deportation. 98 But when the
magistrate judge rather than a district judge conducts the Rule 11
colloquy or accepts the plea, it is unclear whether defendants still have
the right to freely withdraw their pleas. In Benton, for instance, the
appellant had become dissatisfied with his attorney, whom he alleged
had "failed to explain the mens rea element of his conspiracy charge ...
before he pled [guilty]." 99 The district judge found that this
misunderstanding was not a "fair and just reason" for withdrawal.200
Benton appealed this decision, arguing that he should have been able
to withdraw his plea at will prior to its acceptance by the district
judge. 201
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court,
reasoning that "magistrate judges possess the authority to bind
defendants to their plea ... so long as district judges retain the
authority to review the .. . actions de novo."202 Concerned with the
"practical drawbacks" of any other conclusion, the Benton court justified
its decision as a safeguard against creating a "dry run or dress
rehearsal" system, in which defendants could "use magistrate-led
colloquies as go-throughs in order to gauge whether they may later
experience 'buyer's remorse.' "203 Such a regime would not only render
193. See United States v. Benton, 523 F.3d 424, 427 (4th Cir. 2008) (explaining the
circumstances under which a defendant may withdraw a guilty plea).
194. Id. at 428.
195. Id.
196. United States v. Williams, 23 F.3d 629, 631 (2d Cir. 1994).
197. United States v. Chaudhry, 52 F. App'x 540, 541 (2d Cir. 2002).
198. United States v. Salas-Garcia, 698 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2012).
199. Benton, 523 F.3d at 427.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 432-33.
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plea proceedings before magistrate judges "meaningless," but it would
also risk completely "remak[ing] plea-taking procedure ... throughout
the United States," forcing district courts to stop delegating plea
hearings to magistrate judges altogether.204 As the Fourth Circuit
contended, this would "exacerbate the docket tensions" of district
courts, thereby contradicting the original purpose of the FMA.205
Besides affecting withdrawal, acceptance of a felony guilty plea
also raises questions about magistrate judges' authority to undertake
actions such as ordering detention of a defendant. Certain criminal
statutes require immediate detention upon a plea of guilty. For
instance, in United States v. McGrann, the defendant pled guilty to an
offense under the Controlled Substances Act that required the presiding
judicial officer to order detention.206 According to the court, the statute
left "no room for judicial discretion" as to the detention issue.207 Based
on the reasoning of Benton and other related cases, the district judge
held that because the defendant had consented to the magistrate judge
presiding over the Rule 11 proceedings, he had been "found guilty" upon
acceptance of his plea by the magistrate judge. 208 In other words,
because magistrate judges within the Fourth Circuit have the same
binding authority as a district judge to accept a felony guilty plea, the
McGrann court concluded that they also have the authority to actually
convict defendants of certain felonies. 209
Once again, the McGrann court described its decision as justified
by "practical concerns," echoing the Benton court's fear of thwarting the
purpose of the FVIA.210 Additionally, the court expressed unease at the
possibility of "judge shopping" between magistrate judges and district
judges, detailing a hypothetical situation in which a defendant would
decide not to plead before a district judge "on the chance he may remain
free on bond because a magistrate judge is precluded from detaining
him."2 1 1 This would allow a defendant to take advantage of the
"considerable amount of time" that may elapse between pleading before
a magistrate judge and a sentencing hearing before a district judge. 212
204. Id. at 433.
205. Id.
206. United States v. McGrann, 927 F. Supp. 2d 279, 281-82 (E.D. Va. 2013).
207. Id.
208. Id. at 284.
209. See id. (reasoning that magistrate judges should have authority to order immediate
detention of defendants for certain felonies, in order to uphold purposes of the Federal Magistrates
Act).
210. Id. at 285.
211. Id.
212. Id.
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Thus, in an area where a magistrate judge's acceptance of a guilty plea
is not fully binding, there would be a risk of "releasing a ... violent
criminal into the community until the district court is able to 'find' the
defendant guilty and order his detention."213
The existence of ancillary concerns like plea withdrawal and
immediate detention forces courts to analyze magistrate judge duties in
an unusual way. On the issue of detention, for example, rather than
assessing whether the duty was "comparable" to those enumerated in
28 U.S.C. § 636, the McGrann court engaged in a test of practicality,
determining that allowing magistrate judges to accept felony guilty
pleas without giving them authority to detain the criminal would lead
to absurd results. While this reasoning promotes efficiency, it is
concerning from a legal perspective: 214 the district judge would delegate
the detention power not because it is permitted by the FMA, but rather
because another duty would be hampered without it. Arguably, the
McGrann court should have engaged in an independent analysis of the
statutory and constitutional validity of delegating detention to a
magistrate judge.
Both Benton and McGrann were decided in a circuit where
magistrate judges are explicitly authorized to accept guilty pleas,
calling into question the wisdom and legality of this delegation.
However, in United States v. Williams, the Second Circuit still required
the defendant to meet the higher standard for plea withdrawal, despite
the fact that the magistrate judge had only made a recommendation
and the district judge had not yet accepted the plea. 21 5 This raises
questions about the "ultimate" decisionmaker, as the magistrate judge
was able to bind the defendant to a guilty plea solely on the basis of a
"report and recommendation." 216 Meanwhile, in the Seventh Circuit,
where the Harden court drew a line between a colloquy and an
acceptance, the status of these ancillary duties is unclear.
Given that delegation to magistrate judges is conditioned on
district judges retaining the ultimate control over decisionmaking, it is
troubling that some districts treat magistrate judge decisions as final
for certain purposes. This is especially true of the Williams case, which
gave a magistrate judge's "report and recommendation" the full weight
213. Id.
214. See Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 265 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(criticizing Peretz for leaving the courts with "no principled way to answer subsequent questions
that arise" under the FMA and requiring courts to "wade into a constitutional morass").
215. United States v. Williams, 23 F.3d 629, 634-35 (2d Cir. 1994).
216. Id.
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of a district court judgment. 217 While assigning a magistrate judge to
conduct a plea hearing followed by a recommendation is certainly a
more statutorily and constitutionally sound approach than full
delegation of acceptance, treating a recommendation as binding
disrupts the important difference between "dispositive" and
"nondispositive" matters. If magistrate judge orders are fully binding
for certain purposes, it is difficult to draw any principled distinction
between a Rule 11 colloquy and a guilty plea acceptance when analyzing
these tasks under the "additional duties" clause and the Constitution.
Thus, the detention and withdrawal issues highlight how the
delegation of plea-acceptance duties does not occur in a vacuum. With
the authority to accept pleas comes a host of ancillary implications,
including immediate detention and plea withdrawals. Given the
potential harms presented by these ancillary duties, the action of
accepting a guilty plea cannot be analyzed in isolation but must be
assessed in the context of the other duties and powers it affects.
IV. SOLUTION: BALANCING MANAGEABLE DOCKETS
WITH PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS
Ultimately, whether a magistrate judge has the power to
conduct a Rule 11 colloquy or accept a felony guilty plea should hinge
not just on practical considerations, but also on the consequences to
defendants and the constitutional implications. After all, the Peretz
Court stated that the proper test of a permissible "additional duty" is
whether it is "comparable in responsibility and importance" to an
enumerated duty,218 which clearly demonstrates that the significance of
a task is an equal concern to the ease of administration. Thus, to the
extent that consent can authorize magistrate judges to perform tasks
not specifically enumerated in the Federal Magistrates Act, it should
not empower them to enter a judgment that would be "dispositive" in a
felony case.
The significance of a felony guilty plea and its important
ancillary effects suggests that courts should treat it differently than
civil trials or felony jury selection, even if the actual procedure is less
complicated for a magistrate judge to administer than other tasks in
the FIA. In Harden, the Seventh Circuit attempted to accomplish this
by precluding magistrate judges from accepting guilty pleas and
217. See id. at 635 (affirming denial of defendant's attempt to freely withdraw his guilty plea,
even though the magistrate judge had issued only a "report and recommendation," and no formal
acceptance of the plea had yet occurred).
218. Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 933 (1991) (emphasis added).
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requiring a "report and recommendation" procedure instead.21 9 This
decision aligns the delegation with the text of the Federal Magistrates
Act, which precludes magistrate judges from ruling on the most
important pretrial motions. However, it is an insufficient protection for
defendants, given cases like Williams.2 20 There, the defendant was
required to present a "fair and just reason" for withdrawing his guilty
plea, even though the district judge had not formally accepted the
magistrate judge's recommendation. 2 2 1 The Harden Court's reasoned
distinction between plea colloquy and plea acceptance will be effectively
meaningless if courts can circumvent the holding by treating a
recommendation as a binding judgment. Doing so would mean that
Harden's "importance" concerns would apply with equal force in both
the colloquy and acceptance contexts. Thus, district courts should
preclude magistrate judges both from conducting Rule 11 hearings and
also from accepting felony guilty pleas, unless district judges treat
magistrate judge findings as non-final for all purposes.
As suggested by the Fourth Circuit, such a stringent rule may
result in some district courts preferring not to delegate such tasks to
magistrate judges at all.2 2 2 However, such a result is not necessarily
undesirable; courts should not take the decision to delegate lightly
given that adjudicating plea hearings entails a host of ancillary duties,
each with its own potential constitutional concerns. 223 This
distinguishes a guilty plea proceeding from other duties assigned to
magistrate judges, not because it is procedurally more difficult to
administer, but because it burdens more fundamental rights. Thus, the
best way to protect defendants' rights while maintaining judicial
efficiency is to condition magistrate judges' involvement in Rule 11
proceedings on the non-finality of their decisions. In this scenario, all
defendants would be able to withdraw their pleas for any reason prior
to formal acceptance by a district judge.
The court in Benton expressed concerns that such a regime
would lead to a "dress rehearsal" system, in which district judges'
dockets would be filled with motions to withdraw guilty pleas given to
219. See United States v. Harden, 758 F.3d 886, 891 (7th Cir. 2014) (reasoning that district
courts cannot delegate to magistrate judges the duty of accepting guilty pleas).
220. Williams, 23 F.3d at 634.
221. Id.
222. See United States v. McGrann, 927 F. Supp. 2d 279, 285 (E.D. Va. 2013) (reasoning that
district courts may not want to delegate decisionmaking duties to magistrate judges who lack final
authority).
223. See, e.g., id. (allowing magistrate judges to order detention of a defendant prior to district
court sentencing).
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magistrate judges. 224 In the eyes of the Benton court, this would
effectively render the delegation of these duties to a magistrate judge
completely useless.225 However, efficiency is not the sole concern of the
Federal Magistrates Act, and courts must consider separation-of-
powers principles and defendants' rights as well. Moreover, the Benton
court's view is probably unrealistic, as the vast majority of defendants
are likely to maintain a consistent plea throughout the process. It is
those defendants who are most vulnerable, having misunderstood their
rights or the consequences of their actions, who are most likely to
withdraw a guilty plea. 22 6 Defendants who feel they may have been
entrapped, misinformed by their attorneys, or led into an unfair
agreement with the government should be afforded the opportunity to
change a guilty plea for any reason prior to sentencing. District courts
can afford the time to give this fraction of defendants a second chance,
even at the risk of a few people exploiting the system. When
constitutional rights are implicated, the legal system should err on the
side of protecting defendants, especially when the realistic risk of bad-
faith exploitation and court delays is probably quite low. This means
putting defendants' rights above efficiency in dispositive situations in
felony cases.
Furthermore, although the Harden court reached the correct
result with respect to plea acceptance, it did so using a Peretz-style
"comparability" analysis that is arguably unworkable for analyzing the
entry of judgments in a felony proceeding. As Justice Marshall
expressed in his Peretz dissent, courts' application of the "consent"
language from § 636(c) to felony contexts is not textually sound.227
However, insofar as voir dire is a preliminary part of a felony trial with
a direct analogue in the civil context, the Peretz consent analysis may
be a reasonable approach. A felony guilty plea, on the other hand, has
no equivalent in the civil context and, unlike voir dire, disposes of a case
entirely.228 At least in the context of a case-ending felony matter,
treating consent as determinative leads to unnecessary statutory and
constitutional questions. Therefore, courts in these situations should
return to a Gomez-style textual analysis and require that any
contemplated magistrate judge duty fit neatly into a category
enumerated in the Federal Magistrates Act. If, as with felony guilty
pleas, district courts are forced to create new hybrid categories in order
224. United States v. Benton, 523 F.3d 424, 432 (4th Cir. 2008).
225. Id.
226. See supra notes 196-98.
227. Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 943 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
228. See United States v. Harden, 758 F.3d 886, 889 (7th Cir. 2014) (explaining that a guilty
plea "results in a final and consequential shift in the defendant's status").
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to justify the delegation of a task, those courts should invoke the
"constitutional avoidance" canon to deem the duty beyond the bounds
of the statute, regardless of a defendant's consent.
Such a textually based grant of authority to magistrate judges,
conditioned on non-finality, would be both statutorily and
constitutionally consistent. It indicates clearly that guilty plea
proceedings belong with the important, "dispositive" matters in
§ 636(b)(1)(B). From a structural perspective, a "report and
recommendation" system is the only way to ensure that district judges
have total control over these proceedings. It would require that they
either conduct the colloquy themselves or else personally approve one
performed by a magistrate judge. This offers the added benefit of
clarity: no additional consequences can ever result until a district judge
has reviewed and approved the plea proceedings. Armed with this
certainty, district judges would know not to delegate any cases to a
magistrate judge that would raise finality issues, like a crime that
would require immediate detention of the defendant.
Additionally, the non-finality policy would encourage
prosecutors to be clearer about the rights they are asking defendants to
waive through plea agreements. For example, if the government is
concerned that a magistrate judge lacks authority to immediately
detain a criminal defendant, it could "negotiate with a defendant to
voluntarily consent to revocation of release upon entry of a guilty plea
before the [magistrate] judge."229 This could be a desirable solution for
all involved, especially for defendants, who would become more aware
of their rights. Meanwhile, prosecutors would achieve their desired
results, and district judges would know with greater certainty which
plea proceedings to delegate and which to administer themselves. 230
Despite the FMA's goal of efficiency, the Peretz analysis can sometimes
create a quagmire of uncertainty that relies on a district-by-district, ex
post analysis of each proposed "additional duty." In the context of
"dispositive" matters in felony cases, such a system is incompatible with
constitutional protections. A guarantee of non-finality would remedy
the problem and create a practical need for judges and prosecutors to
be more forthcoming about consequences, a result that could benefit the
most vulnerable criminal defendants.
229. United States v. Yanni, No. CR-09-1363-PHX-NVW (LOA), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
100049, at *19 (D. Ariz. Sept. 2, 2010).
230. See Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580, 596 (2003) ("A bright-line rule brings clarity and
predictability, and, in light of . . . constitutional implications . . . these values should not be
discounted.").
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V. CONCLUSION
Despite the relative ease of taking felony guilty pleas compared
with the amount of time they consume on district judges' dockets, these
tasks should not be delegated to magistrate judges given the significant
rights they burden. Not only does a felony guilty plea involve the waiver
of important individual rights, but the task also does not appear to fit
neatly into the statutory scheme of the Federal Magistrates Act without
raising constitutional separation-of-powers issues. Under any
interpretive framework, the gravity of the concerns raised by
magistrate judge acceptance of a guilty plea in a felony case makes the
duty dissimilar to those that appear in the FMA. Thus, a magistrate
judge's involvement with the Rule 11 process should be purely
administrative. It can greatly benefit the efficiency of district courts
when magistrates handle the standardized set of questions involved in
a plea colloquy and make a recommendation of their findings. However,
if a district judge were to empower the magistrate judge to bind a
defendant in any way to a felony guilty plea, that delegation would
become both statutorily and constitutionally unsound. Further, it would
open the door to a host of ancillary issues, each with its own
constitutional implications. In terms of consequences to individual and
structural rights, binding a person to a decision of guilt in a felony case
is the most significant action the U.S. judiciary can perform. To delegate
such power to a magistrate judge undermines the protections afforded
by the justice system in the name of efficiency.
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